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Introduction   
 
When new opportunities are introduced into societies, the benefits are often contested.  In 
particular, men and women frequently renegotiate their traditional roles and responsibilities with 
the advent of new opportunities. Some evidence, much of it descriptive and anecdotal, suggests 
that it may not be appropriate to model household decisions regarding the use of these new 
opportunities as cooperative decisions.  Cooperative models may overlook the contested nature 
of intra-household decision making.  Understanding the nature of such contestation is critical for 
those who seek to introduce new opportunities to a given society in the name of development.  
What appears to be a beneficial intervention under the assumption that households act 
cooperatively may instead lead to unforeseen, potentially adverse, outcomes if decisions are 
contested.  
One frequent source of new opportunities arises when market opportunities develop for 
goods that have been traditionally produced and consumed within the household.  In most 
economic analyses, market institutions are treated as a fixed set of rules that guide economic 
behavior.  It is, however, important to recognize that as markets develop, new rules associated 
with the market must be reconciled with existing cultural rules.  Observed economic behavior 
may be the result of a negotiation process over which rules, those of the market or those 
prevailing in the culture, are applicable.  
In this paper, we investigate intra-household patterns of decision making for the Gabra 
who are nomadic pastoralists in northern Kenya. Over the past thirty years, herders in northern 
Kenya have seen a rapid growth of milk marketing opportunities.  What makes this situation 
intriguing is that among the Gabra, traditional cultural rules allocate the responsibility to decide 
where to locate the household to the husband, while the management of milk is the wife’s  
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domain. As livestock-raising in the Gabra area requires frequent migration and milk marketing 
only takes place in the small market towns of the study area, the analysis of these two decisions 
allows unique insight into intra-household negotiation over new market opportunities.  Simply 
put, we investigate how men use their decision-making power on migration to influence their 
wife’s milk marketing. 
As we will elaborate below, people in the area describe four possible reactions by 
households to the new opportunities presented by the development of milk markets.  The first 
possibility is that husbands and wives recognize the market opportunities and make joint 
decisions on location and milk marketing to maximize household welfare. We call this the 
cooperative solution.  A second possibility is that husbands take over the milk marketing and 
decide individually regarding location and milk marketing.  This is a specific case of a 
cooperative solution.
1 A third possibility is that husbands continue to make location decisions 
without considering the impact on milk marketing. We call this the traditional solution.  The 
final possibility is that husbands view wives’ use of milk markets with trepidation, as milk 
marketing allows wives to expand their control over household milk to control over cash income.  
In this case, men may make location decisions to limit their wife’s ability to market milk. We 
call this the contested solution. We formally model these outcomes below and then empirically 
investigate the pattern of household decision-making using panel data from Gabra pastoral 
households. 
The outline of this study is as follows.  Section two presents a brief review of the 
literature on intra-household decision-making.  Section three describes the nature of pastoral 
production in the study area. Section four presents information on the data used in this study.  
Section five formalizes the three models of decision-making described above: the cooperative  
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model, the traditional model, and the contested model.  In section six, results of empirical 
analysis of household decisions are presented.  A concluding section discusses the implications 
of these findings. 
 
Empirical Literature on Cooperative and Noncooperative Outcomes 
Most of the literature on household decision-making assumes that households act 
cooperatively.  Although the literature on noncooperative models is expanding, there are still 
relatively few empirical examples where the outcome is noncooperative.  Many empirical studies 
that have examined the issue of whether some measure of bargaining power affects household 
decisions simply assume that the outcome is cooperative.   
  Much of the intrahousehold literature focuses on whether or not the household can 
appropriately be modeled as a single decision maker or whether the bargaining power of 
individuals within the household affects outcomes. For example, using data from Brazil, Thomas 
(1993) tests whether the distribution of nonlabor income among household members affects 
expenditures and finds that nonlabor income controlled by women is associated with a larger 
share of expenditure on human capital and leisure. Thomas and Chen (1993) find similar results 
for Taiwan.  In Ghana, Doss (1999) finds that the share of assets owned by women is significant 
in explaining household expenditure patterns. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) test whether 
assets brought to marriage by each spouse have differential effects on household-level and 
individual-level outcomes in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa.  The most 
consistent result that they find is that when women control relatively higher shares of resources, 
a greater share of the household budget is spent on education. Other outcomes that have been  
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explored are health and education outcomes for children. All of these examine which cooperative 
model of the household is appropriate.  
  None of these results rejects the notion that the outcome is a cooperative one.  Thomas 
and Chen (1993) explicitly test for Pareto Efficiency in consumption and do not reject it. 
Similarly, Bourguinon, et al. (1993), use data on households in which both adults work full time 
and in which there is at most once child and claim that the behavior that they observe is 
consistent with a Pareto efficient outcome.  Thus, individual preferences and power may affect 
the outcomes of household decisions, but the decisions appear to be cooperative outcomes. 
  Two examples of noncooperative outcomes come from studies that examine production 
decisions within the household.  Udry (1996) uses detailed agronomic data from Burkina Faso 
and finds that crop yields are different on plots controlled by men from those controlled by 
women within the same household in a given year.  He also finds that households could achieve 
higher total output by reallocating labor and fertilizer from men’s plots to women’s plots.  Pareto 
efficiency would require that marginal productivity for an additional unit of labor or fertilizer be 
the same across all plots owned by the household. Thus, he rejects a cooperative outcome.   
  Similarly, Jones (1983) rejected a cooperative outcome in her study of labor allocation 
following the introduction of irrigated rice production in Northern Cameroon.  Both men and 
women continued to grow sorghum after irrigated rice was introduced, even though the returns to 
labor from rice production were higher.  Men and women jointly cultivated the rice fields, 
whereas sorghum plots were individually cultivated.  Women received some compensation for 
working on rice plots, but the amount of compensation was contested. Reallocating labor from 
sorghum to rice would again have increased total household production.   
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  This example from Cameroon highlights a theme that is found frequently in the literature 
– the introduction of new technologies or opportunities often results in the gains being contested. 
Descriptions of these contestations are widespread in the literature on women in development, 
but relatively few instances are explicitly modeled and tested.  Similar to the example of the 
introduction of irrigated rice in Cameroon is that of the Gambia.  Von Braun and Webb (1989) 
found that with the introduction of irrigated rice in Cameroon, men took over rice cultivation, 
displacing the women who had traditionally grown rice. In addition, women began growing 
cotton and groundnuts, which were traditionally men’s crops.  The introduction of a mechanical 
maize sheller into a Nigerian village shifted the control of the shelling process from men to 
women (Lapido 1991).  The men responded by contesting the women’s right to charge for 
shelling and eventually some of the men seized the machine.   
  Another way that researchers have examined intrahousehold decision making is by 
examining risk sharing within households.  Two studies suggest that household members do not 
fully pool their risk with each other. Dercon and Krishnan (2000) find that  poor southern 
households in Ethiopia do not engage in complete risk sharing; women in these  households bear 
the brunt of adverse shocks. They reject the collective model of the household which imposes 
Pareto efficiency on allocations. Doss (2001) finds that in Ghana shocks to men’s and women’s 
incomes have different affects on household expenditure patterns.  These studies provide support 
for the idea that individual household members may be concerned about their own long-term 
access to resources and that membership in a household is one way, but not the only way, that 
they seek to ensure this access.  
  Most of the models look at these issues in a static framework.  In a static framework, it is 
challenging to think about why households would not reach cooperative outcomes.  However, in  
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the longer term, changing the relative positions of individuals within the household will affect 
the distribution of resources.  Although, at this stage, our model is static in the sense that it does 
not cover more than one time period, the story for why we see noncooperative outcomes is due to 
concern over the potential long-term changes within households that could result from women 
gaining control over income.   
   
Gabra Pastoral Production  
Gabra are nomadic pastoralists living in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia.  Gabra 
inhabit an extremely arid and variable environment.  Mean rainfall is below 300mm for most of 
the Gabra rangelands.  Rainfall is also highly variable, with a coefficient of annual variation of 
58 in Chalbi.  Gabra households share access to their grazing area, and migrate throughout this 
area in reaction to changing pasture conditions.  Gabra households migrate with their herds of 
camels, cattle, goats and sheep and rely almost entirely on these animals to meet their household 
needs. 
In Gabra culture, the husband is given the right to decide when and where to move the 
household and the household herd.  Such moves can be over extremely long distances.  
Traditionally, upon the husband’s decision to migrate, the housing materials and all the 
household belongings are loaded onto camels and moved to the new location he has selected.  It 
is the woman’s responsibility to reconstruct the house when they reach the new location and the 
husband’s responsibility to build new night enclosures for the animals from thorny bushes.  They 
will remain at this site until the husband decides the time has come to move again. 
All things inside the hut are under control of the wife.  Gabra symbolism is rich with 
contrasts between that which is inside the hut (female) with what is outside the hut (male).  This  
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is played out each evening in the ritual surrounding the milking of the herd.   After the animals 
return from grazing, they are placed in their night enclosures and milked by a designated milker 
(women are not allowed to milk camels, nor are sexually active men).  The containers full of 
milk are then taken to where the husband sits outside the door of the hut.   He inspects the milk, 
takes a ritual sip, and then passes it through the door into the hut where his wife receives it.  
When it passes into the hut, it becomes the wife’s and it is her responsibility to manage it.  
Traditionally, the management responsibility meant that the wife decided how much to 
use for each meal, how much to conserve as fermented milk or ghee, and how much to give away 
to other households.  Increasingly, it means she decides how much of the milk will be marketed 
and how much will be consumed by the household.  The marketing option has introduced a 
change in the nature of the management decision. Marketing allows the transformation of milk 
produced from the herd into cash.   As she will usually spend this money on goods before 
returning to the family in the evening, she is now presented with a new set of decisions over how 
to spend this income.  We use evidence on how men use migration decisions to influence their 
wife’s milk sales to investigate the nature of the intra-household negotiation over granting the 
wife this decision-making power. 
 
Description of the Data 
  This study uses longitudinal data gathered in two areas of Marsabit District, Kenya.  
Gabra pastoralists occupy the two areas studied:  the Chalbi area and the Dukana area. The 
Chalbi area is drier than the Dukana area, but has more water points as it lies along the lowland 
Chalbi basin.  Marketing is more developed in Chalbi than in Dukana, since Dukana is more 
remote and less served by transport; vehicles traveling to Dukana must first past through Chalbi.   
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The data was gathered using a sampling methodology similar to a transect.  Enumerators 
walked between the main towns of the study area and interviewed nomadic households they met 
along the way.  This approach was chosen as there is no population list of exclusively nomadic 
herders to sample from in the study area.  
The questionnaire was retrospective in nature, recording information for four time 
periods per year for each of the years 1993-1997.  Within a year, the four time periods 
correspond to the bimodal rainfall pattern of the area:  the long rains, the dry season following 
these rains, the short rains, and the dry season following these rains.  Each period is roughly 
three months in length. 
  Respondents were asked to report the following variables for each time period:  ages of 
household members; household size; starting period household herd size and species 
composition; average milk production from the herd per day
2 and total milk sales per period; and 
other sources of household income.  Household size was converted into an adult equivalent scale 
following the method outlined by Martin (1985).
3 Variables recording herd size are converted to 
total livestock units (TLU), following the method of Schwartz et al (1991).
4  The results appear 
to be reliable, both in terms of respondents ability to provide answers and in terms of the internal 
coherence of the results. 
  Variables exogenous to the household are also recorded in the data set.  Four variables 
are used to record rainfall characteristics of a given time period; one measures total rainfall in the 
current three-month period plus the last three-month period, a second measures the percent of 
this total that fell in the current three month period, and the final two are dummy variables that 
record whether the period in question is a rainy season.  A variable records the tons of food aid  
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delivered to the towns of the study area in a given time period.
5  Table 1 presents summary 
statistics of variables used in later regressions. 
Milk marketing is relatively new in the Gabra area.  It began to appear in the late 1960’s, 
as towns began to grow in the Gabra area.  Now, milk marketing is widespread.  In the Chalbi 
sample, 67% of the 39 surveyed households sold milk at some time between 1993 and 1997.  In 
Dukana, 86% of the 49 surveyed households were involved in milk marketing over the same 
period.  Milk sales accounted for 11% of household cash income on average in Chalbi and 14% 
in Dukana. In contrast, livestock sales provide the majority of household cash income; 73% in 
Chalbi and 67% in Dukana. 
 
Models of Household Decision Making 
 
  Three different models of household decision making are presented.  In each, the 
household decides where to locate and how much milk to sell.
6  
A)  Cooperative Decision Making 
  In this model, the household decides on the distance to settle from town and the milk 
sales level in a cooperative manner.  Here, we model it as a joint decision by the husband and 
wife.  If instead, the husband took over the milk marketing and made both distance and sales 
decisions himself, the outcome would still be a cooperative one
7. The outcome maximizes the 
joint household utility function.  For both the husband and wife, define a logarithmic utility 
function.  Utility is an increasing and concave function of consumption.  Total household utility 
is obtained by summing the utility of the husband and the wife. Therefore total household utility 
is defined by  
) ( ln ) 1 ( ) ( ln ) (
w h c c c U a a - + =               (1)   
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where h represents the husband, w represents the wife, and a represents the weights for the 
individual consumption in the utility function. Consumption (c) includes milk consumed by the 
household members, goods purchased with the income from milk sold, and goods purchased 
from the sale of livestock.  Assume that decisions over the sale of livestock occur prior to 
decisions over household location and milk sales, so that the herd contribution to consumption is 
fixed at hc when the location and milk sales decisions are made.
8  Total milk production is m, 
milk sales occur at price p,
9 and milk sales are represented by s. Consumption can be represented 
  p s s) (m hc c ￿ + - + =                    (2)  
  The distance from town to the household location is represented by d. Milk markets are 
located in towns.  Therefore, the labor effort involved with marketing milk is an increasing 
function of milk sales and distance from town.  Assume the labor cost of milk marketing can be 
represented by a multiplicative specification  d s 1 ￿ ￿ w , where  1 w represents a parametric weight 
on milk marketing labor. 
  Towns also are the centers of amenities, such as health centers, schools, news and 
communication centers, public security, and markets for consumption goods.  Therefore, settling 
further from town provides disutility by reducing household members’ ability to access these 
amenities.  However, as other herders also desire to be near town to take advantage of these 
amenities, labor effort for herding increases the closer one settles to town.  Represent these two 
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where w2 and w3  again represent parametric weights on distance. 
  The household thus solves the following problem.  
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Thus, in the cooperative model, the two decisions are made simultaneously and each 
depends on the other.  Households choose the distance from town as a decreasing function of 
milk sales.  Households choose milk sales as a decreasing function of distance.   
 
B) The Traditional Model. 
  In this model, we assume that the husband makes the location decision without 
considering how this influences milk sales.  In this case, a husband acts and the wife reacts.  The 
husband is still operating under the traditional cultural rules, and has not yet introduced milk 
marketing as a strategic consideration in his decision.  Assume he views the proceeds of milk 
marketing as his wife’s concern and does not consume the products purchased from milk sales. 
He decides where to locate the herd based on his own considerations and leaves it to his wife to 
adjust her milk marketing accordingly.  The husband decides the distance from town variable by 
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while his wife takes the distance as given and solves:           
d d s p s s m hc Max
w
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In this case, distance is determined independently of milk sales and the milk sales 
decision is a decreasing function of distance.  
 
C) The Contested Model. 
  In this model as in model (B) we assume that women control the income from milk sales 
and that the proceeds from milk sales do not enter the husband’s consumption. In contrast to 
model (B), the husband has now understood that the introduction of milk marketing has created a 
new decision-making context.  In this situation, the husband has realized that his power as first 
mover allows him some leverage to manipulate his wife’s milk sales.
 10  As the milk sales lead to 
less milk for him to consume, it is in his interest to reduce the wife’s incentive to sell.  
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while the wife is faced with the problem: 
d d s p s s m hc Max
w
s 2 1 ) ) ( ( ln w w - ￿ ￿ - ￿ + - +           (12) 
  Solving recursively, we arrive at the first order condition for the wife from (12) above.  
Substituting this into the husband’s decision problem and maximizing gives us the following.  
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In this case, distance is an increase function of milk sales, and the milk sales decision is a 
decreasing function of distance.  
The comparison of the three models is summarized as follows: 
  Cooperative  Traditional  Contested 
Distance Variable  Decreasing in s  Not a function of s  Increasing in s 
Milk Sales Variable  Decreasing in d  Decreasing in d  Decreasing in d 
 
  We expect the milk sales variable to be always decreasing in distance.  The distinction 
between the three models depends on the sign and the significance of the milk sales parameter in 
the equation for distance.  These results provide the foundation for the empirical estimations that 
follow. 
 
Empirical Analysis  
In this section, we use observed values for the distance a household settles from town in a 
given period and the total amount of milk sold in the period to investigate the relationship 
between these decisions. Denoting the distance from town decision by d, the milk sales decision 
by s,  g and bas parameters to be estimated, X as matrices of exogenous variables, and u as 
underlying disturbance terms, the following two equation system is defined:  
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             (16) 
  Given our analysis above, the parameter of interest is the sign and significance of  s g in 
the distance equation.  If estimation reveals it to be negative and significant, this result is 
consistent with the cooperative model.  If it is not significant, the result is consistent with the 
traditional model.   Finally, if we find it to be positive and significant, this provides a result 
consistent with the contested model. 
Three issues emerge when attempting to estimate this system of equations.  First, both 
dependent variables are by construction non-negative and censored at zero.  Distance from town 
equals zero for 7% of observations in Chalbi and 3% in Dukana.  In addition, no milk was sold 
for 72% of observations in Chalbi and 82% in Dukana.
11  Failure to take account of the censored 
nature of dependent variables results in inconsistent parameter estimates. As the equations are 
specified as a system, the methodology used is full information maximum likelihood estimation 
of a  bivariate tobit system (Maddala 1983). 
  A second issue arises due to the longitudinal nature of the data.  It is possible that there 
are underlying household specific characteristics that influence livestock transfer behavior.  If 
not controlled for, the presence of such characteristics will lead parameter estimates to be 
inconsistent (Hsiao 1986).  The response used to address this issue was to include a time 
invariant household specific effect by creating a matrix recording the means of household 
specific variables for all time periods observed.  The unobserved household specific effect is 
assumed to be a function of these household specific means. 
  A third issue is the possibility that milk production is endogenously determined.  In other 
words, if milk production is a function of distance, and milk production increases the further one  
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is from town, we could misinterpret a husband’s decision to move away from town in order to 
increase milk production as evidence supporting the contested model. We take two steps to 
address this issue.  First, we present the results of a fixed effects estimation of milk production.  
These results (see Table 2) indicate that the distance a household settles from town has no 
significant impact on milk production.  Second, we present results of estimations of equation 
(16) with and without milk production included as a regressor.  
  Estimations are conducted separately for the Chalbi and the Dukana data.  As both the 
land and the market associated with these two towns differ, there may be parametric differences 
in the decision processes.  Table 3 presents results of simultaneous tobit estimation of milk sales 
and distance from town decisions for the Chalbi sample and the Dukana sample. 
  The results show clearly that the coefficient on milk sales in the distance estimation is 
positive and significant, thereby supporting the contested model of the household.  As expected, 
the coefficient on distance in the milk sales estimations are negative and significant.  As distance 
increases, milk sales decrease.  There is almost no difference between the two specifications for 
each sample; the model is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of milk production.  In Dukana, 
milk production affects milk sales, but this is not the case in Chalbi.  In neither sample does milk 
production affect distance.  The herd size variables are not statistically significant in the 
estimation of either location or milk sales decisions. Age of the oldest members of the household 
does affect these decisions.  There is some evidence of seasonality in both distance from town 
and milk sales based on the seasonal dummies.  In Dukana, food aid deliveries decrease the 
distance from town and increase milk sales. Food aid is usually delivered to the towns and thus 
they provide an incentive for people to locate closer to town.   
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Conclusion 
  The results are consistent with a contested model of household decision-making.  Men 
appear to be making decisions about the distance from town in order to limit women’s ability to 
market milk.  This result is consistent with the notion that men resist the ability of their wives to 
obtain independent sources of income.  While women gain the benefits of milk marketing, men 
are reluctant to facilitate this.   
  Is this contestation a good thing or a bad thing for overall household welfare?  We do not 
have the data to adequately address this issue in this context.  Since most studies indicate that 
income in women’s control is more likely than men’s income to be spent on goods for children
12, 
it may be that children’s welfare would increase if women earned income from milk sales.  On 
the other hand, by selling milk, women are also reducing the amount of milk available to the 
household.  Thus, the impact on children is ambiguous. We leave as a topic for further study who 
is “right” in this case; husbands who argue milk marketing has a negative impact on household 
utility or wives who argue it has a positive impact on household utility.   
What we can say is that husbands and wives are in a process of adjusting to the new 
opportunity brought about by milk marketing in this area.  Our evidence suggests the most 
appropriate way to understand the process is one of contestation.  Husbands are using their 
traditional right to decide migration patterns to influence wives sales’ decisions.  Wives are 
asserting that their traditional right over milk management extends to this new setting.  This 
finding suggests that the introduction of market opportunities for goods that are traditionally 
home consumed may meet with resistance within the household.    
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics  
 










Distance --base camp to town (hours 
       walk) 
5.13  4.78 
 
8.27  8.22 
Milk Sales (liters per period * 20  
       shillings per liter)
a 
408.47  843.57  29.27     70.05 
Milk Production (liters per day)  
 
5.33  4.67  3.71       2.19 
Herd size in TLU 
 
43.27  32.70  18.66       6.84 
Herd size in TLU / Adult Equivalent 
 
9.07  5.14  4.68       1.77 
Household Size in Adult Equivalents 
 
5.09  2.12  4.14       0.99 
Percent at satellite camp (of labor force 
    for Chalbi, of herd for Dukana) 
33.88  31.89 
 
24.15     30.56 
Rainfall in mm over past six months  58.39  42.09 
 
65.53     47.57 
Long Rains Dummy  0.27  0.45 
 
0.25       0.43 
Short Rains Dummy  0.24  0.43 
 
0.25       0.43 
Food aid deliveries in tons per period  72.37  88.97 
 
65.22     85.74 
Age of oldest male in household  47.12  14.33 
 
53.12     12.09 
Age of oldest female in household 
 
37.19  13.48  36.50     10.04 
Number of Observations  707    980   
 
Number of Households 
 
39 
   
49 
 
a Note that the price of milk was constant at 20 shillings per liter over the entire period.    
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Distance in hours from town
2  -0.0001 
(0.0013) 
0.0016   * 
(0.0008) 








Rainfall in past six months
2 (x 10










Short rains dummy 
 




Time trend  


















2 ) ( c   176.0 ***  103.5 *** 
Distance significance
2
2 ) ( c   4.3  0.1 
R
2  .38  .28 
Number of observations  687  980 
* indicates significance at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 level 
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Table 3.  FIML Simultaneous Tobit Results for Distance from Town and Milk Sales 
    Chalbi            Dukana       
 
Distance 
from Town  Milk Sales   
Distance 
from Town  Milk Sales 
  Distance 
from Town  Milk Sales   
Distance 
from Town  Milk Sales 
Milk Sales 
 3.2671 *** 









Town  - 
-1.4153 ***
(0.3518)  - 
-1.4169 ***
  (0.3644)  - 
-0.1200 ***















































































































Long rain dummy 
-0.8170
(0.5435)

































Age of oldest male
2.1030












(0.7791) -   
-2.0049  **
(0.8004) - 
3.1793   *
(1.7527) -   
3.0999   *
(1.8445) - 
 
Age of oldest 
female  - 
4.0646  **








Age of oldest 
female
2  - 
-3.6750  **




(0.9086)  - 
-2.2026   *
(1.2005)
 
Milk production in 











































Herd size joint sig. 
2
2 ) ( c  
0.44  0.35    0.33  0.52 
 
3.32  4.68   *    1.58  0.78 
 
Age joint sig. 
2
2 ) ( c  
7.10  **  6.34  **    6.29  **  6.61  ** 
 
15.70 ***  18.33 ***    8.75  **  7.82  ** 
 
Fixed effect joint 
sig. 
2
4 ) ( c   15.24 ***  13.71 ***    16.25 ***  13.73 *** 
 
17.27 ***  11.11  **    14.27 ***  9.52  ** 
 
Beta sig.
2 c  
553.15 ***  17.51    561.58 ***  19.43 
 




2 c   561.39 ***    569.16 *** 
 
1637.32***    1680.82 *** 
* indicates significance at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, *** at the .01 levR 
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Notes 
 
1 In this paper, we do not try to distinguish among the different types of cooperative outcomes. 
Much of the intrahousehold literature has focused on determining which cooperative outcome 
results, based on bargaining power or other factors.   Here we are interested in whether or not the 
outcome is a cooperative one.   
 
2 This is the milk produced for human consumption.  Traditionally, half the udder of a milking 
animal is taken for human consumption and the other half is left for young stock to suckle.  
 
3 The adult equivalent weighting scheme used in this study assigns a value of one to individuals 
of both sexes older than 15, a value of .6 to individuals 6-14 years old, a value of .3 to children 
ages 2-5, a value of .1 for children under 2.  
 
4 One livestock unit = 10 sheep or goats = 1 head of cattle = 0.7 camels.  This differs slightly 
from the scheme in Schwartz et al. as they weigh 11 goats equal to one TLU.  As the total 
number of sheep and goats is the variable recorded in the data set, the composite measure of 
smallstock is assigned a weight of 1 animal = 0.1 TLU. 
 
5 The rainfall and food aid records were provided by the Catholic mission in North Horr and the 
AIC mission in Kalacha.   
 
6 While the focus of this paper is the dynamic process of cultural adaptation to market 
development, we develop our argument through models of different states of this process as 
separate static models rather than through use of a unified dynamic model.  This keeps the model 
as simple as possible while illuminating our main points.  We leave as a future extention the 
connection of these different phases in a unified dynamic model. 
 
7 Within the cooperative models, the outcomes would differ depending on the weights assigned 
to each person’s utility.  But changing the weights would not affect the sign on the distance 
variable, which is our concern in this paper.  
 
8 This allows us to focus attention on the static aspect of the distance and milk sales decision.  
Livestock sales introduce a dynamic element to the model that we chose to ignore at this stage in 
the interest of simplicity.  
 
9 The price of milk was constant over the study period at a price of 20 shillings per liter. 
 
10 Wives advance the story that milk sales will enhance household welfare overall, as they 
provide food and clothing for themselves and the children with this income, leaving the husband 
to consume the milk-based diet that he expects.  In this case, assume the children’s welfare is 
subsumed under the wife’s utility.  Milk sales in this case expand the household’s budget 
constraint due to the advantageous caloric terms of trade, thus expanding overall household 
welfare, while not detracting from the husband’s utility.  Husbands, alternatively, argue that  
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when women gain control over income they will adversely impact the household budget as they 
will spend the proceeds of milk sales on town based boyfriends thus depriving the household of 
both milk and income from milk sales.  In this case, assume the children’s welfare is subsumed 
under the husband’s utility.  While the former story is perhaps more credible than the latter, it 
remains an area for further research. 
  
11 Note that although most of the households sold milk during at least one of the periods of the 
survey, most of these households also had periods where they sold no milk.  
 
12 See for example, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Doss (1999), Thomas (1993).  